Student Commentary to Professor Murray:
Educating a Benefit Corporation’s Board of Directors on
Reporting
Abigail Caldwell
While a concept such as a benefit corporation seems promising for
the future of business associations law, work like Professor Murray’s is
useful to analyze how it operates as a practical matter.1 This comment will
highlight aspects of the law that must be changed to ensure that benefit
corporations can be fully effective. The somewhat bleak landscape of
benefit corporation reporting is a great example of a weak spot in the law
that can create problems for the entity’s many constituencies it is designed
to govern. This commentary will analyze the issue through the lens of a
lawyer advising the board of directors of a benefit corporation on
reporting requirements.
I believe a lawyer’s ethical obligations are triggered by this issue.
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct require that lawyers represent
their clients with competence.2 Competence “requires . . . thoroughness
and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”3 Lawyers are
also required to act with “reasonable diligence” in representation.4 Both of
these duties require informing a corporate client on legal duties and
possible consequences for non-compliance.5
But how can a lawyer motivate a board of directors to comply with
reporting requirements that, to a non-lawyer, probably seem tedious or a
waste of time? In the book, Leading Change, the first of John Kotter’s eight
steps for implementing change is creating a sense of urgency.6 A lawyer
can create a sense of urgency by educating the board on what exactly is
required by the statute and the penalties they may incur for failing to file.
This conversation can be as approachable or formal as the situation
demands. Whether it is through a spoken presentation or a written, stepby-step guide, the lawyer should cater this discussion to what is going to
help a corporate client’s board understand and act.

J. Haskell Murray, Enforcing Benefit Corporation Reporting, 23 TENN. J. BUS. L. (2022).
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT R. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
3 Id.
4 Id. at r. 1.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
5 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT pmbl. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
6 JOHN P. KOTTER, LEADING CHANGE 35 (2d ed. 2012).
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In a Delaware public benefit corporation, the board must strike a
balance between considering stockholder interests, the interests of those
who are “materially affected” by its actions, and the corporation’s goal of
social good that is listed in the certificate of incorporation.7 The Model
Benefit Corporation Legislation requires balancing shareholder interests,
constituencies of the firm like customers or employees, and social and
environmental welfare.8 The board must consider each of these interests
when making a decision about filing a report. In some cases, the only
information customers or lower-level employees receive about the firm’s
actual social impact will be through these reports.
The fiduciary duties of loyalty and care also apply to director
action regarding reporting requirements. The duty of care requires fully
informed decision making.9 When making decisions about whether to file
a report, the board should be fully informed on the timing of reporting,
the contents of the report, and penalties for failing to file.10 Delaware case
law recognizes duties of oversight and good faith under the duty of
loyalty,11 with a failure to “exercise reasonable oversight” recognized as
evidence of a lack of good faith.12 I would pose the following question: is
it not in bad faith to know of a legal requirement and blatantly not comply?
Depending on the client, it may be helpful to mention reputational
concerns as well. A goods and services firm may attract customers due to
their status as a benefit corporation. Knowledge that the firm is not
complying with reporting requirements could lead customers to question
whether the firm has simply chosen this entity as a method of virtue
signaling. The idea that a firm is taking advantage of the marketing benefit
of this entity when it is not willing to complete a report required or

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365(a) (2020).
MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 301(a)(1) (BENEFIT CORP. 2017).
9 See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872–73 (Del. 1985) (recognizing that “a
director’s duty to exercise an informed business judgment” falls under the duty of care).
10 Id. at 874.
11 Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006).
12 In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996)
(recognizing oversight failure as evidence of a lack of good faith); Ritter, 911 A.2d at 370
(stating that the duty of loyalty is violated when directors act in bad faith or fail to exercise
oversight).
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encouraged by statute could drive customers away. In this case, it may be
useful to present the B Lab “Certified B Corp” as a possible alternative.13
Additionally, stockholders’ interests must be considered by a
benefit corporation’s directors. They also have a certain degree of power
to hold directors accountable for their inaction. Completing and filing a
report can potentially be a costly and time-consuming action. The
stockholders, however, have the power to bring an enforcement suit to
enforce the interest-balancing requirement mentioned above.14
Stockholders also have the power to sue derivatively.15 The directors
should be advised that failure to file could open the firm up to litigation
that could also carry great costs. Other penalties could include
administrative dissolution or loss of benefit corporation status.16 As
Professor Murray states, losing benefit corporation status can be a “de
minimis” cost for firms in certain jurisdictions.17 Even so, the loss of status
or administrative dissolution will create costs and result in the loss of the
allure of benefit corporation status. Reincorporating or filing the
paperwork to be reestablished as a benefit corporation may be costly and
may lead to the reputational issues mentioned above.18 Shareholders also
have the power to elect and remove directors.19 Mentioning this in the
conversation may trigger a desire for self-preservation in a board member.
Though this may have a minute effect on certain directors, this selfpreservation desire could lead others to view reporting as a more vital task.
Conclusion
These are just the high points, but we, as lawyers, have a
responsibility to make our clients aware of their legal duties and the
possible consequences of failing to execute those duties. I believe that if
we approach this in an educational manner, lawyers could have a positive
effect on rates of report filing now and in the future as the law develops.
Murray, supra note 1, at 4. (“[T]he B Lab cost may capture some of the marketing value
of social enterprise generally to companies.”).
14 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 367 (2020); MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 305 (BENEFIT
CORP. 2017).
15 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 327 (2020); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.41 (AM. BAR ASS’N
2016).
16 See generally Murray, supra note 1.
17 Id. (noting Minnesota’s $500 fine for reinstatement).
18 Id.
19 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141(k), 211(b) (2020); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 8.03(c),
8.08 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
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